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T
he current financial crisis is widely 
viewed as the most serious since 
the Great Depression. Last week, 
facing severe market reactions to 
the failures of AIG and Lehman 
Brothers, the US Treasury Department put for-
ward a bold and massive program of spending 
up to $700 billion on purchasing “troubled 
assets” from financial institutions. 
This paper critiques this proposed emer-
gency legislation. It also puts forward a supe-
rior alternative for advancing the two goals of 
the proposed legislation—restoring stability to 
the financial markets and protecting taxpayers. 
I show that the proposed legislation can be re-
designed to limit greatly the cost to taxpayers 
while performing better in terms of restoring 
stability to the financial markets. 
Although it is widely accepted that the cur-
rent problems in the financial system result from 
problems in the housing market, the emergency 
legislation, and my analysis in this paper, focus on 
the current crisis of liquidity, capitalization, and 
confidence in the financial sector. Throughout, I 
accept the two stated objectives of the Treasury’s 
plan—restoring stability to the financial sector 
and protecting taxpayers—and show how they 
can be better served by a redesigned plan.
The proposed redesign is based on four in-
terrelated elements: 
• No overpaying for troubled assets: The 
Treasury’s authority to purchase troubled assets 
should be limited to doing so at fair market 
value. 
• Addressing undercapitalization problems 
directly: Because the purchase of troubled 
assets at fair market value may leave financial 
firms severely under-capitalized, the Trea-
sury’s authority should be expanded to allow 
purchasing, again at fair market value, new 
securities issued by financial institutions in 
need of additional capital.
• Market-based discipline: to ensure that 
purchases are made at fair market value, the 
Treasury should conduct them through multi-
buyer competitive processes with appropriate 
incentives.
• Inducing infusion of private capital: to fur-
ther expand the capital available to the finan-
cial sector, and to reduce the use of public 
funds for this purpose, financial firms should 
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be required or induced to raise capital through 
right offerings to their existing shareholders. 
Below I discuss in turn each of these four 
elements. In the course of my analysis, I dis-
cuss major flaws of the proposed legislation that 
would undermine its effectiveness and explain 
how the plan I put forward can address them.
purchasing troubled assets
The premise of the Treasury’s plan is that the current crisis is due to the presence of 
“toxic” real-estate paper on the balance sheets. 
Financial firms can currently sell these “trou-
bled assets” only at an extremely deep discount 
to face value if at all. The Treasury believes that 
the presence of these illiquid troubled assets 
“clogs” the financial system and is “choking off 
the flow of credit.” Because of the substantial 
presence of these illiquid troubled assets on the 
balance sheets of financial firms, the Treasury 
believes, financial firms have difficulty raising 
capital, are subject to risks of creditor runs, 
and are reluctant to carry out fully their role in 
financing the real economy. 
One reason why troubled assets cannot 
currently be sold at face value is probably due 
to the decline in the fundamental economic 
value of these assets due to the correction in 
the housing market. The Treasury believes, 
however, that financial firms cannot currently 
sell these assets even at their reduced funda-
mental value. In a normal, well-functioning 
market, with sufficient supply of interested 
buyers, such assets can be expected to trade at 
their fundamental value—the discounted pres-
ent value of their “hold-to-maturity value.” The 
Treasury believes, however, that we currently 
do not have such a normal, well-functioning 
market. Rather we have a “limits to arbitrage” 
situation in which money managers that would 
otherwise be willing to purchase financial as-
sets at any price below their fundamental value 
do not have sufficient liquidity to keep prices 
at fundamental values. The proposed legisla-
tion seeks to provide such liquidity through 
the use of public funds. 
Accepting the need and desirability of using 
public funds to provide liquidity to the market 
for troubled assets, the critical issue concerns 
the price at which the Treasury would attempt 
to buy these assets. The Treasury’s official state-
ments about the plan contemplate purchas-
ing troubled assets at fair value: “The price of 
assets purchased will be established through 
market mechanism where possible, such as 
reverse auctions.” Such an approach is appeal-
ing, of course, because purchasing assets at fair 
market value might enable taxpayers to get an 
adequate return on their investment. 
While the Treasury’s statements contem-
plate purchases at fair market value, however, 
the draft legislation is careful to grant the 
Treasury full authority to pay higher prices 
for troubled assets. As Aaron Edlin and others 
have pointed out, the draft would permit the 
Treasury, if it so chooses, to spend, say, $700 
billion for troubled assets with a fair value of 
only $200 billion, making taxpayers poorer by 
half a trillion dollars. 
This freedom to confer massive gifts on pri-
vate parties is highly problematic. It should be 
constrained: the legislation should direct the 
Treasury to buy assets at fair market value. 
Some might ask whether directing the 
Treasury to purchase troubled assets only at 
fair market value might not make the purchase 
program inconsequential. Would this prescrip-
tion not lead the Treasury to purchase troubled 
assets at fire sale prices and thus not add signifi-
cantly to the options available to firms. Accept-
ing the diagnosis of our current predicament 
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underlying the Treasury’s proposal, the answer 
is no. At present, the prices are viewed as sub-
stantially below fundamental value due to the 
drying up of liquidity and the lack of fund sup-
ply that ensures pricing at fundamental value 
in normal times. Thus, the fair market value 
that the Treasury would pay would be one that 
would reflect market outcomes under condi-
tions of adequate liquidity. What mechanism 
will best ensure that the prices paid for troubled 
assets purchased for taxpayers would indeed 
reflect such outcomes is a question I will take 
up later on. 
dealing directly with undercapitalization 
problems
By itself, imposing the fair market value constraint on purchases of troubled assets 
might leave us with stability concerns that 
the Treasury sought to address by retaining 
the power to overpay. Because the depressed 
housing market reduced the fundamental 
value of troubled assets, some financial firms 
may well remain seriously under-capitalized 
even if they could sell troubled assets at fair 
value. The Treasury wants the power to over-
pay for troubled assets to be able to improve 
the capital position of these firms to restore 
stability and prevent creditor runs. 
Let us suppose for the time being, as the 
Treasury’s plan does, that infusion of addi-
tional capital to financial firms must at this 
point come, at least to a substantial degree, 
from the government. Even so, such infusion 
of capital should not be done by giving gifts 
to the shareholders and bondholders of finan-
cial firms through over-paying for their assets. 
Rather, the provision of such additional capi-
tal should be done directly, aboveboard, and 
for consideration. 
While the Treasury’s draft legislation gives 
it large and unusual powers, some of which 
need to be scaled back, there is one power 
that the Treasury was not given but should 
be. The draft legislation allows the Treasury 
to purchase only pre-existing assets. This 
limitation shoots taxpayers in the foot, pre-
venting the government from getting newly 
issued securities from firms receiving capital 
infusions from it. This limitation should be re-
vised to allow the Treasury to purchase—again 
only at fair market value—new securities in 
financial firms when doing so is necessary for 
stabilizing financial markets. 
Authorizing the provision of capital in 
return for newly issued securities is far supe-
rior to authorizing, as the current draft does, 
the provision of capital through overpaying 
for troubled assets. To begin, taxpayers would 
be better protected; they would get adequate 
consideration for the capital they are provid-
ing rather than nothing at all, as under the 
Treasury’s plan which provides capital through 
subsidized purchases of troubled assets. 
Furthermore, the direct approach would 
do a better job in providing capital where it is 
most useful. If the proposed legislation were 
implemented, capital would be inefficiently 
channeled, as the amount of troubled assets 
sold by firms would not necessarily be related 
to the amount of capital that they need and 
should get from the government. 
Before moving on, I should comment on an-
other approach that some lawmakers (such as 
Senator Christopher Dodd) and commentators 
(such as Paul Krugman) have raised: directing 
the government to insist on getting some newly 
issued securities—shares or warrants—in finan-
cial firms from which the government would 
purchase troubled assets. These proposals have 
been motivated by similar concerns to the one 
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I have – that the Treasury’s plan contemplates 
subsidizing some firm through overpaying for 
their troubled assets. To the extent that such 
overpaying will happen to shore up the firms’ 
capital positions, these observers ask, why 
should the government not get at least some 
equity tickets to compensate it for the subsi-
dized purchase of troubled assets? 
While the motivation for these suggestions 
is understandable, and while they go in the di-
rection I advocate—preventing the government 
from subsidizing firms from which troubled 
assets are purchased—they still unnecessarily 
tie together purchases of troubled assets and 
provision of new capital. Such tie-in does not 
reduce the government’s need for information 
or make matters otherwise simpler: the govern-
ment would still need to assess how much it is 
overpaying for the purchased troubled assets 
and what new equity tickets would provide ad-
equate consideration for the amount overpaid, 
which would require the government to deter-
mine both the fair market value of the troubled 
assets and the fair market value of new equity 
securities issued to it. 
In such a case, there would be no reason not 
to proceed in a manner reflecting explicitly and 
aboveboard the transactions taking place—that 
is, specify separately the price paid for the trou-
bled assets (in a transaction aimed at paying 
fair market value for them) and the price paid 
for the new equity securities (in a transaction 
aimed at paying fair market value for them). 
Moreover, tying equity participations to pur-
chases of troubled assets is problematic because 
of the already mentioned lack of correlation 
between the need for governmental purchases 
of troubled assets and the desirability of gov-
ernmental infusion of capital. Some financial 
firms would like to sell a substantial amount of 
troubled assets to the government but do not 
need a governmental infusion of capital; and, 
conversely, some financial firms would need a 
capital infusion but would not wish to make 
significant use of the government’s willingness 
to purchase troubled assets. 
Before concluding the discussion of capi-
tal provision for adequate consideration in 
newly issued securities, it should be stressed 
that this is possible only for financial firms 
that are undercapitalized but still solvent. 
If a firm is insolvent and its shares thus do 
not have a positive fundamental value, any 
number of new equity securities may be 
insufficient to provide the government with 
adequate consideration. In such a case, the 
process of infusing new capital for adequate 
consideration—whose implementation I de-
scribe below—would not result in an infu-
sion of new capital. Even in a highly liquid 
and well-functioning market, a firm that is 
insolvent would not be able to get capital by 
selling additional equity participations 
Thus, even with (i) a mechanism for using 
public funds to provide liquidity to the mar-
ket for troubled assets and enable firms to sell 
such assets at fair value, and (ii) a mechanism 
for using public funds to provide liquidity to 
the market for new capital for financial firms 
to enable such firms to sell new equity shares 
at fair market value, the government might 
well face a subset of financial firms that would 
be insolvent. For those firms that are either 
federally insured (banks) or whose bank-
ruptcy would have sufficiently large negative 
system-wide effects, the government may de-
cide to have a “bailout.” Such a bailout, how-
ever, should involve wiping out shareholders’ 
stakes, with the government effectively get-
ting the full value of equity in return for its 
support. For those firms that are not federally 
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insured and whose bankruptcy would not 
be judged to have sufficiently large negative 
system-wide effects, the government should 
let the insolvency proceed through standard 
processes (as it has decided to do in the case 
of Lehman Brothers). 
Because the decline in the fundamental 
value of troubled assets may have rendered 
some financial firms truly insolvent, some 
bailouts and/or bankruptcies of financial 
firms may be unavoidable even under the 
proposed plan for using public funds to pur-
chase troubled assets and new equity securi-
ties at fair value. However, that would hardly 
mean that the availability of mechanisms (i) 
and (ii) above—using public funds to provide 
liquidity in the markets for troubled assets 
and new capital for financial firms—would 
not be valuable. These mechanisms would 
ensure that bailouts and bankruptcies would 
be limited to that subset of firms—which 
would hopefully turn out not to be substan-
tial in scope—that would be insolvent even in 
the absence of liquidity problems and market 
disruptions, namely, even if they could sell 
troubled assets and new equity participations 
at prices reflecting fundamental values.
market-based mechanisms for purchasing 
assets at fair market value
The plan I am putting forward would au-thorize the governments to use public 
funds both to purchase troubled assets, as the 
Treasury plan suggests, and to purchase newly 
issued securities by financial firms in need of 
additional capital. Both types of purchases 
should be at fair market value. The devil, how-
ever, is in the details. How would the govern-
ment know whether it is purchasing assets at 
fair market value and avoiding over-paying for 
assets at taxpayers’ expense? 
The proposed legislation allows the Trea-
sury to conduct purchases through in-house 
operations, outside delegation, or any other 
method it chooses. It would be best, however, 
to direct the Treasury to operate through agents 
with strong market incentives. 
Suppose that the economy has illiquid 
mortgage assets with a face value of $1,000 
billion, and that the Treasury believes that 
the introduction of buyers armed with $100 
billion could bring the necessary liquidity to 
this market. The Treasury could divide the 
$100 billion into, say, 20 funds of $5 billion 
and place each fund under a manager verified 
to have no conflicting interests. Each man-
ager could be promised a fee equal to, say, 5% 
of the profit its fund generates—that is, the 
excess of the fund’s final value down the road 
over the $5 billion of initial investment. The 
competition among these 20 funds would 
prevent the price paid for the mortgage assets 
from falling below fair value, and the fund 
managers’ profit incentives would prevent the 
price from exceeding fair value. 
The above example is intended to illustrate 
the point, of course, rather than to suggest par-
ticular details for the fee structure of the funds’ 
managers. It would be necessary to determine 
the percentage of profits granted to managers 
and the threshold above which this percentage 
would be applied. One could consider taking 
the competitive idea one additional step: after 
a pool of candidates that pass threshold condi-
tions in terms of expertise and lack of conflict-
ing interests is selected, the selection could be 
based on bidding process in which candidates 
would bid the profit percentage for which they 
would be willing to manage a fund. 
Given that the decentralized system I am 
describing is far from straightforward, let me 
explain why it might nonetheless be preferable 
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to having the government conduct purchases 
of a given class of assets through a single buyer, 
possibly located in house in the Treasury. Cer-
tainly, a situation in which a Treasury in-house 
official bargained one-on-one with a financial 
firm over the value of an asset would raise seri-
ous concerns. The Treasury’s statement sought 
to allay these concerns by raising the possibil-
ity of using market mechanisms such as auc-
tions or reverse auctions. 
Suppose that the Treasury seeks to pur-
chase some units within a certain class of as-
sets—say, trench C in mortgage pool M. Under 
one possible procedure described by Chairman 
Bernanke in Congressional testimony, the Trea-
sury could name a price it is willing to pay per 
unit, based on its estimate of the hold-to-ma-
turity value of these units, and financial firms 
would then decide to sell. But estimating ac-
curately the hold-to-maturity value requires 
making estimates of the incidence of mortgage 
re-payment years down the road, and it would 
be rather difficult for a Treasury official—or 
for those reviewing the official’s decisions—to 
know whether the estimate made by the official 
is close to or far from accuracy. Indeed, it would 
be difficult to know this even in retrospect; if 
hold-to-maturity returns fall below the price 
paid, this might be due to negative realization 
of uncertainty rather than to the use of an esti-
mate that was too low when made. 
Moreover, the Treasury official would face 
private actors with powerful incentives to max-
imize their interests. Thus, even if Treasury 
officials are as likely to err in one direction as in 
the other in making their estimates, the result 
would be systematic overpaying for assets. For 
sellers would be more likely to accept the price 
named by Treasury for units of trench C of pool 
M when the price is set too high and less likely 
to do so when the price is set too low. 
An alternative procedure that a centralized 
one-buyer process could use would specify not 
the price that the Treasury is willing to pay for 
units in the class of assets but the number of 
units it is seeking to acquire—say, 50% of the 
units. The Treasury would then invite owners 
of units to submit offers as to the price at which 
they are willing to sell such assets, and it would 
purchase units at whatever level is sufficient to 
induce sale offers for the 50% of the units. In 
theory, this could work when ownership of 
units in this class of assets is dispersed among 
owners that cannot effectively coordinate the 
prices they would demand. However, in situ-
ations in which assets are owned by a con-
centrated group or by repeat players that can 
implicitly coordinate strategies, such auctions 
may produce inflated prices. 
mandating rights offerings
My discussion thus far assumed, following the assumption underlying the Treasury’s 
plan, that, because capital markets “froze,” 
new capital infusions to financial firms need, at 
least to a substantial degree, to come from the 
government. However, financial firms that are 
undercapitalized but clearly solvent, as many 
financial firms seem to be, should be able to 
raise significant additional capital from private 
sources. It should be emphasized that the gov-
ernment has thus far not exhausted its options 
in terms of inducing financial firms to raise ad-
ditional capital from private sources.
Following the Bear Stearns collapse in 
March, the government urged and encouraged 
some financial firms to raise additional capital. 
However, the government has not thus far 
required financial firms to go out and raise 
additional capital, and it should do so. As was 
suggested by Raghuram Rajan in a recent op-ed 
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piece in the Financial Times, the government 
could and should require financial firms that 
have substantial but sub-optimal capitalization 
to raise capital through rights offerings to exist-
ing shareholders. While such rights offerings 
would not be effective for firms in relatively 
fragile situations, they could bring significant 
additional capital to firms that are clearly sol-
vent; this would substantially increase the 
aggregate capital available to the financial sector 
and, in turn, expand the pool of credit available 
to Main Street. There can be little doubt that 
if, say, Bank of America were required to make 
a rights offering at a price significantly below 
its current market price, the offering would 
be fully subscribed, would bring in significant 
additional capital, and hence would expand 
the capacity of this bank to provide financing 
to the real economy.
Because the proposed legislation is part-
ly motivated by a concern that the financial 
sector’s undercapitalization might undermine 
its ability to finance Main Street, mandating 
such rights offerings would contribute sub-
stantially to addressing this concern. Fur-
thermore, it would do so at no cost to tax-
payers. Thus, mandating rights offerings for 
an appropriate subset of the country’s finan-
cial firms should be a useful supplement to 
(and partial substitute for) the use of public 
funds for these purposes. 
The case for mandating rights offerings 
might be questioned on grounds that firms can, 
of course, choose on their own to raise new 
equity capital through rights offerings or other-
wise. A mandate would necessarily be harmful 
in situations in which a firm on its own would 
choose not to do a rights offering, so the argu-
ment goes, and would be unnecessary in situ-
ations in which firms would choose to do so 
on their own. But this critique should not be 
accepted for two reasons. 
To begin, as pointed out by Rajan, a “lem-
ons” problem—in particular, fear of negative 
informational inferences that the market may 
draw from a decision to make a rights offer-
ing—might discourage a firm from doing so 
even if it needs capital. In contrast, when a 
rights offering is mandated by the government 
for a substantial set of firms, the market will 
not draw a negative inference about the manag-
ers’ private information from the existence of a 
rights offering. Furthermore, the premise of the 
Treasury’s plan is that the existence of adequate 
capitalization in given financial firms has sub-
stantial positive spill-over effects on other firms 
in the economy. The existence of such effects 
might well make it desirable in the current cir-
cumstances to expand the capital available to 
financial firms even if financial firms’ existing 
shareholders would privately prefer not to do 
so in order to avoid diluting their earnings. 
conclusion
Because the Treasury’s plan would infuse cap-ital through overpaying for troubled assets, 
it would impose massive costs on taxpayers and 
might not channel needed capital to its most 
valuable uses. The proposal put forward in this 
paper would do a far better job both in terms of 
protecting taxpayers and in terms of restoring 
financial stability. 
Because I focus in this paper on the fi-
nancial sector problems that the Treasury 
proposal seeks to address, I have abstracted 
from the problem of the housing market. It 
is generally recognized that the financial sec-
tor’s problems are in part due to the “correc-
tion” in the housing market. Nonetheless, the 
assumption underlying the Treasury’s plan is 
that government intervention should focus 
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on the financial sector. The Treasury (now) 
recognizes that the problems of the finan-
cial markets should not be left to the market 
to sort out but rather require government 
intervention. However, once this interven-
tion brings stability and liquidity to financial 
firms, the Treasury believes, the problems of 
the housing market can still be left for market 
forces to sort out. Unfortunately, however, 
the housing market is not a Coasian setting 
in which such adjustments can occur with-
out much cost. Thus, additional government 
intervention in connection with the housing 
market may be warranted alongside the inter-
vention in the financial markets that has been 
the focus of this short paper. Whether and 
what intervention would be warranted is a 
question that is beyond the scope of the pres-
ent paper, however, and I plan to consider it 
in separate work. 
Letters commenting on this piece or others may 
be submitted at submit.cgi?context=ev.
references and further reading
Bebchuk, Lucian (2008) “How to Pay Less for 
Distressed Financial Assets,” The Wall Street 
Journal, September 26.  http://wsj.
net/article/SB122238704668077137.html.
Edlin, Aaron (2008) “Questioning the Treasury’s 
$700 Billion Blank Check: An Open Letter to 
Secretary Paulson,” The Economists’ Voice, 5(5): 
Art. 4. vol5/iss5/art4
Rajan, Raghuram (2008) “Desperate Times Need 
the Right Measures,” FT.com, September 19. 
Treasury Department (2008) Proposed legisla-
tion. viewcontent.cgi?
context=ev&article=1408&file
name=0&type=additional.
Brought to you by | Harvard University
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/5/16 4:30 PM
